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Administrative Law
by Martin M. Wilson*
I.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

This Article surveys the Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia Court of
Appeals administrative law cases from June 1, 2003 through May 31,
2004. Over two dozen pertinent cases were decided during the survey
period, many of them containing highly novel elements. The novelty of
certain facets of the cases only stands to reason, as all levels of
government continue to increase reliance upon administrative agencies
to perform necessary functions. The regulatory framework imposed by
these agencies never fills in all the blanks regarding those functions.
The unanswered questions invariably invite appellate court decisionmaking.
No attempt has been made in this Article to review cases that are
administrative in nature but fall under another specific subject matter
of this issue. Rather, the central themes for this Article are appellate
cases highlighting the administrative procedures of agencies, the
ramifications of agency decisionmaking, and, as noted above, appellate
attempts to fill in the blanks for administrative agencies.
This Article begins with two cases regarding standing to initiate
proceedings and then moves to the defenses and immunities posed by
agencies and their personnel. Next, the Article covers standards for
review and other appellate interpretative tools, with three general
divisions of cases. The effect of agency actions and the questions arising
therefrom are then covered, followed by a section dedicated to cases in
which the manner of appeal is featured. Finally, this Article enumerates
legislation relating to administrative agencies and procedures from the
Georgia General Assembly during the 2004 regular session.

* Partner in the firm of Troutman Sanders, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1975; J.D., with honors, 1978). Member, State Bar of Georgia. The Author wishes
to thank Troutman Sanders, LLP summer associate Qian "Bonita" Wang for her assistance
in compiling this Article.
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STANDING TO INITIATE PROCEEDINGS

In the first of two cases during the survey period dealing with
standing decisions, a nonresident alien attempted to bring a wrongful
death action under the Georgia Tort Claims Act ("GTCA")' against the
Department of Transportation ("DOT"). 2 In Gonzalez v. Department of
3
plaintiff's husband was killed in a traffic accident
Transportation,
allegedly due to negligence on the part of the DOT. The DOT moved for
summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff had no standing to bring an
action under the GTCA because of her status as a nonresident alien.4
The superior court granted the summary judgment motion, and the court
of appeals affirmed.'
The appellate court began its analysis by examining the recent
controlling supreme court case, AT&T Corp. v. Sigala, in which the
supreme court interpreted the provisions of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") sections 1-2-10 and 1-2-11, 7 as granting resident
aliens the right to access state courts, but not extending that right to
nonresident aliens.' Next, citing the venue provision of the GTCA,' the
court determined that a suit against the DOT would only lie in the
county of the accident, which was obviously within the state.'0 Thus,
plaintiff could not properly bring suit under the GTCA in the appropriate county in Georgia, and sovereign immunity would otherwise protect
the DOT."
The second case in which standing was an issue dealt with a tree
protection ordinance passed by the Dekalb County Board of Commission-3
ers.12 In Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass'n v. DeKalb County,1
plaintiffs were primarily developers and builders who wished to overturn
the tree ordinance on the grounds that it had not been properly

1. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 (2002).
2. Gonzalez v. Dep't of Transp., 265 Ga. App. 610, 594 S.E.2d 783 (2004).
3. 265 Ga. App. 610, 594 S.E.2d 783 (2004).
4. Id. at 610, 594 S.E.2d at 784.
5. Id.
6. 274 Ga. 137, 549 S.E.2d 373 (2001).
7. O.C.G.A. § 1-2-10 to -11 (2002).
8. AT&T Corp., 274 Ga. at 140, 549 S.E.2d at 377.
9. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28 (2002).
10. Gonzalez, 265 Ga. App. at 611, 594 S.E.2d at 785.
11. Id. at 611-12, 594 S.E.2d at 785.
12. Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass'n v. DeKalb County, 277 Ga. 295, 588 S.E.2d
694 (2003).
13. 277 Ga. 295, 588 S.E.2d 694 (2003).
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promulgated.14 The superior court upheld the ordinance, and the
supreme court heard the appeal.'" In affirming the decision, the court
noted a subsidiary contention raised by the builders. The elements for
decisionmaking under the ordinance lacked necessary limitations on the
discretion granted to the officer, namely the county arborist. 6 The only
problem with this contention was that none of the builders and
developers were appealing an adverse ruling from the arborist, thus,
plaintiffs had no standing to bring suit.17
III.

AGENCY DEFENSES AND IMMUNITIES

How much immunity is enough? In GeorgiaDepartment of Defense v.
Johnson,'8 the state's sovereign immunity proved unnecessary, as
intramilitary immunity protected the State Adjutant General."'
Plaintiff, Johnson, was a civil technician at Dobbins Air Force Base and
maintained membership in the Georgia National Guard. He filed a
GTCA claim against the Georgia Department of Defense ("Department")
because of a workplace injury, using the theory that the State Adjutant
General had either trained or supervised him improperly in his work.
The Department's motion for summary judgment was denied, and the
ruling was subsequently appealed. 0
Going back to Feres v. United States,2 ' the Department contended
that no claim could be asserted by plaintiff as a result of workplace
injuries." Obviously, a military force would be hard to maintain for
very long if each and every injury that incurred could result in a lawsuit.
The court of appeals had little problem applying a Feres analysis and
saw the matter as containing two questions: "(1) whether the State
Adjutant General and Johnson were acting in the course of military
service at the time of his injury and (2) whether the allegedly negligent
acts of insufficient training and supervision arose from military rules
and decisions."23
Regarding the first question, the relevant facts were that plaintiff, a
federal employee required to be a member of the Georgia National

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 295, 588 S.E.2d at 695-96.
Id., 588 S.E.2d at 695.
Id. at 299, 588 S.E.2d at 698.
Id.
262 Ga. App. 475, 585 S.E.2d 907 (2003).

19. Id. at 475-76, 585 S.E.2d at 908.
20. Id. at 476, 585 S.E.2d at 908.
21. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
22. Johnson, 262 Ga. App. at 476, 585 S.E.2d at 908.

23. Id. at 477, 585 S.E.2d at 909.

34
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24
Guard, was repairing a military helicopter at the time of his injury.
These facts indicated to the appellate court that his act was indeed
military service." Likewise, the court had little problem determining
that the National Guard and its staff and operations, by their very
origins and federal relationships, must be military in nature."
Accordingly, the training, supervision, and background relationships
leading to the training and supervision decisions were all military
functions. 7 The trial court was thus reversed.
Back in the civilian world, the court in Smith v. Chatham County29
ruled on the immunity defense of a county and its police officers.3" The
Smiths sued Chatham County as a result of a wreck in which their
automobile had been hit by a criminal suspect's pick-up truck during a
chase with a county police officer. Summary judgment was granted to
the county, and plaintiffs appealed. 3
The court of appeals sought answers to two basic questions regarding
immunity. First, plaintiffs argued that the county waived its sovereign
immunity under O.C.G.A. section 33-24-5 132 by purchasing liability
insurance."3 The county successfully showed, however, that there was
no such policy of liability insurance, and that it had merely budgeted
amounts for liability claims in order to make payments on claims that
the county felt were justified.34 In short, self-insurance was not
envisioned by the statute, so the county had not waived
insurance 3 as
5
immunity.
Second, plaintiffs alleged that the police officers had no immunity
because the pursuit and apprehension of the pick-up truck driver was a
ministerial duty or, if it indeed was a discretionary duty, had been
committed with malice.3 6 In affirming the trial court's position on the
immunity of the officers, the court of appeals noted, in addition to case
law, that the county's official policies on police chases made the decision

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 478-79, 585 S.E.2d at 909.
Id., 585 S.E.2d at 909-10.
Id. at 479, 585 S.E.2d at 910.
Id. at 479-80, 585 S.E.2d at 910.
Id. at 480, 585 S.E.2d at 910.
264 Ga. App. 566, 591 S.E.2d 388 (2003).
Id. at 566, 591 S.E.2d at 388.
Id., 591 S.E.2d at 389.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (2004).
Smith, 264 Ga. App. at 567, 591 S.E.2d at 389.
Id. at 568, 591 S.E.2d at 390.
Id.
Id. at 569, 591 S.E.2d at 390.
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to initiate a chase a discretionary one." The second argument also
failed because nothing in the record suggested to the court the presence
of actual malice or intentional wrongful actions.38
39
Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Oglesby
started as a GTCA case, but that is not how it ended. Oglesby's mother
died in 1949 from Paget's disease, a rare condition in which the skeletal
bones grow abnormally large. The former Medical College of Georgia
obtained the body, and doctors subsequently wrote research articles and
placed the skeletal remains on display. Oglesby first contacted the
Medical College of Georgia about her mother's remains in approximately
1987. However, her ante litem notice under the GTCA was not served
on the Board of Regents until 2000. After an apparent breakdown in
negotiations for a settlement regarding the cause of action, suit was filed
on November 1, 2001, under a variety of tort theories. The Board of
Regents filed both a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary
judgment, which the trial court denied.4 °
41
The court of appeals accepted an interlocutory appeal and reversed.
The Board of Regents relied upon three defenses, which it brought to the
attention of the trial court: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction based
on sovereign immunity, (2) plaintiff's failure to file her case within the
statute of limitations, and (3) the more traditional defense that no facts
had been produced to show tortious acts.42
The court viewed all of the acts complained of as occurring in 1949
Additionally, the
and within the knowledge of plaintiff by 1987.4
burden was on plaintiff to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity by
the Board of Regents, and the appellate court concluded there was no
such evidence." The trial court erroneously ruled that plaintiff did not
become aware of the fate of her mother's remains until 1999, meaning
that the application of the GTCA provision on limitations would have
otherwise been authorized. 45 This ruling, however, was cited by the
court of appeals as unsupported and, because the GTCA contains an
effective date and application provisions barring retroactive application

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 569-70, 591 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 570, 591 S.E.2d at 391.
264 Ga. App. 602, 591 S.E.2d 417 (2003).
Id. at 602-04, 591 S.E.2d at 419-20.
Id. at 602, 591 S.E.2d at 419.
Id. at 604, 591 S.E.2d at 420.
Id. at 606, 591 S.E.2d at 421-22.
Id. at 605, 591 S.E.2d at 421.
Id. at 605-06, 591 S.E.2d at 421.
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before January 1, 1991, the existence of immunity meant no cause of
action would be recognized.4 6
A good case on the application of the GTCA to relationships between
state agencies and vendors was decided by the court of appeals during
the survey period. In Department of Human Resources v. Johnson,4"
plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the Department of
Human Resources ("DHR"), the Department of Juvenile Justice ("DJJ"),
and a child care institution under contract with the agencies known as
Broken Shackle Ranch, Inc. Plaintiff's son was in the custody of the
state agencies as a juvenile offender and was placed at the Broken
Shackle Ranch juvenile facility. A supervisor at the facility instructed
the son to engage in certain cleaning chores and, particularly, to sweep
behind a freezer. The son was electrocuted, giving rise to the cause of
action."
In the trial court, the state agencies defended the suit based upon
immunity under the GTCA, and they also argued that immunity
extended to Broken Shackle Ranch and the supervisor, as a type of
employee. Motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict were denied,
and a trial
on the merits produced a multi-million dollar verdict for
49
plaintiff.
The questions for the court of appeals focused on the relationship
between the state agencies and their contractors when analyzed under
the implementation of the waiver of sovereign immunity for the state by
the Georgia Constitution and the amended GTCA.50 The court noted
that the Georgia Constitution's waiver requirements state that a
legislative act must specifically provide for that waiver and for the
The court concluded the relevant GTCA
extent of the waiver."
provisions included a waiver for state officers and employees.' 2
Contrary to the argument advanced, however, the waiver was not broad
enough to extend to an independent contractor or its employees under
the theory of respondeat superior, expressed in O.C.G.A. section 51-25,53 because the GTCA does not explicitly incorporate those provisions. 4 Amendments to the GTCA in 1994 clarified that the use of

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 606, 591 S.E.2d at 421-22.
264 Ga. App. 730, 592 S.E.2d 124 (2003).
Id. at 730, 592 S.E.2d at 126.
Id. at 730-37, 592 S.E.2d at 126-30.
Id. at 732-33, 592 S.E.2d at 127-28. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9; O.C.G.A.

§§ 50-21-22 to -23 (2002).
51.

Johnson, 264 Ga. App. at 732-33, 592 S.E.2d at 127-28.

52. Id. at 733, 592 S.E.2d at 128.
53. O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5 (2000).
54. Johnson, 264 Ga. App. at 732-34, 592 S.E.2d at 127-28.
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"officers and employees" excluded both independent contractors and
corporations. 5 Thus, the state agencies could not be found liable, and,
conversely, Broken Shackle Ranch and its employee could not claim
immunity as a defense.5" While the case against the state agencies was
reversed, the verdict against the remaining defendants was upheld.5 7
The issue in Hart v. Appling County School Board" also centered on
time-relevant analysis of immunity for state agencies.59 In 1990 when
plaintiff Hart was eight years old, he was hurt on playground equipment
at his elementary school. He filed a lawsuit in 2002, a year after
reaching the age of majority, claiming negligent supervision at the time
of his injury and failure of defendant Appling County School Board
("School Board") to keep the playground equipment in safe condition.
Citing both sovereign immunity and the additional defense of protections
under the Recreational Purposes Act,' the School Board moved for
summary judgment. The trial court, in granting summary judgment to
the School Board, relied on both sovereign immunity and plaintiff's
failure to present facts necessary to show proximate causation.6 The
GTCA provisions were not an issue.62
Upon appeal by plaintiff, the court of appeals reversed.63 The court
first noted that the cause of action arose in 1990, and the trial court did
not use the laws as they existed at that time in its analysis.' The
correct provision of the Georgia Constitution6 5 contained a waiver of
sovereign immunity if there was liability insurance in place. 6 That
issue had not been addressed by either side in the case, so the necessary
facts to sustain a summary judgment based on sovereign immunity were
not in the record.
In its alternative argument, the School Board cited the Recreational
Purposes Act, under which a landowner has protections from liability
when allowing his property to be used by the public for recreational

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 735-36, 592 S.E.2d at 129-30.
Id. at 736-37, 592 S.E.2d at 130-31.
Id. at 738-39, 592 S.E.2d at 131-32.
266 Ga. App. 300, 597 S.E.2d 462 (2004).
Id. at 301, 597 S.E.2d at 464-65.
O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-20 to -26 (2000).
Hart, 266 Ga. App. at 300-01, 597 S.E.2d at 464.
Id.
Id. at 300, 597 S.E.2d at 464.
Id. at 301, 597 S.E.2d at 465.
GA. CONST. art I, § 2, para. 9(c).
Hart, 266 Ga. App. at 301-02, 597 S.E.2d at 465.

67. Id.

38
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purposes.' Unfortunately, the court determined the School Board had
not placed into the record of the case sufficient facts to show that the
school playground fit that pattern. 69 On the contrary, plaintiff proved
as a part of his case that the playground was fenced and used by school
Finally, on plaintiffs failure to present
children like himself."0
necessary evidence regarding the playground equipment's condition, the
court of appeals concluded that the ruling by the trial court was
procedurally deficient. 7 ' The use of plaintiffs evidentiary failure for
judgment in the School Board's favor had not been cited in its motion for
summary judgment.7 2 Accordingly, plaintiff possessed improper notice
under the civil procedure rules and should have been extended a right
to respond.73 In summary, while the School Board may have been
immune from suit, there was no factual basis in the record to support
such a decision.
In Oconee Community Service Board v. Holsey,74 the court relied on
an interpretation of waiver limitations under the GTCA for its ruling. 5
Plaintiff's daughter lived in a home operated by the Oconee Community
Service Board ("Board"). Another resident, who attacked a caseworker
less than a week before and was obviously mentally ill, stabbed the
daughter to death. In the ensuing wrongful death action, plaintiff
claimed the Board was negligent for placing the mentally ill person in
the home given the knowledge of her mental illness and her prior attack
on the caseworker. The Board moved to dismiss the claim alleging
sovereign immunity, but the motion was denied by the trial judge.
However, the judge allowed the ruling to be reviewed immediately and
an interlocutory appeal was obtained.7 6
The court of appeals had little problem reversing the denial of the
motion to dismiss.7 7 First, the court determined the Board was a state
agency.78 Second, the court applied the relevant provisions of the
GTCA. 79 The court cited the specific statutory exception for any

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 302, 597 S.E.2d at 465.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 303, 597 S.E.2d at 466.
Id.
Id.
266 Ga. App. 385, 597 S.E.2d 489 (2004).
Id. at 386, 597 S.E.2d at 491.
Id. at 385, 597 S.E.2d at 490.
Id.
Id.
Id.; O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7) (2004).
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liabilities based on assault or battery."0 The court then concluded the
fact that no state employee committed the wrongful act was irrelevant
to the analysis because case precedent previously held the analysis
should center on the resulting loss.'
English v. Fulton County Building Authority82 contained an analysis
by the court of appeals regarding when an entity created by local
legislation would be entitled to sovereign immunity.8 3 Plaintiff English
had a slip and fall incident in a building owned by the Fulton County
Building Authority ("Authority") and leased to Quality Living Services,
Inc. for use as a senior center. A lawsuit was filed, but the trial judge
granted both defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Authority
defended primarily on sovereign immunity, and the lessee secured a
summary judgment based upon lack of knowledge of the on-site
84
conditions. The latter ruling was not a part of the appeal.
immunity,
sovereign
In answer to the Authority's argument claiming
plaintiff asserted to the court of appeals that the legislature had not
explicitly afforded the Authority such protections.85 The court, howev86
Instead, using the
er, ruled that was not the determining factor.
same case cited by plaintiff, Thomas v. Hospital Authority of Clarke
County,s7 the court stated that the two correct questions to address
were: (1) whether the functions were essentially those normally carried
out by government, and (2) whether sovereign immunity would protect
The answers to the relevant questions were
public tax dollars. 8
favorable to the Authority because its enactment contained recitations
89
Addion its public purposes and essential governmental functions.
nor
own
of
its
revenues
tionally, the Authority had neither separate
9
paid.
be
could
judgment
a
which
from
protections of insurance
Accordingly, sovereign immunity was available to the Authority as a
defense.91

80. Holsey, 266 Ga. App. at 386, 597 S.E.2d at 491.
81. Id. (quoting Dep't of Human Res. v. Coley, 247 Ga. App. 392, 544 S.E.2d 165 (2000)
and other cases).
82. 266 Ga. App. 583, 597 S.E.2d 626 (2004).
83. Id. at 584-86, 597 S.E.2d at 627-29.
84. Id. at 583-84, 597 S.E.2d at 627.
85. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Hosp. Auth. of Clarke County, 264 Ga. 40, 440 S.E.2d 195
(1994)).
86. Id. at 585-86, 597 S.E.2d at 628-29.
87. 264 Ga. 40, 440 S.E.2d 195 (1994).
88. English, 266 Ga. App. at 584-85, 597 S.E.2d at 628.
89. Id. at 586, 597 S.E.2d at 629.
90. Id.
91. Id.

40
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In the last case for this section, the Georgia Supreme Court answered
certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit regarding sovereign immunity possessed by a municipality.9 2 In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of Garden City,93 CSX
Transportation, Inc. ("CSX") allowed the City of Garden City ("City") to
place water and sewer lines under the railroad's property. The
agreements contained indemnification provisions in favor of CSX and
specified that the City would maintain all necessary insurance for the
obligations. CSX later incurred liabilities because of a train collision
with a truck owned by a city contractor, but the City would not answer
for the damages.94 After a series of rulings in the matter, the federal
court of appeals certified to the Georgia Supreme Court the following:
(1) May a Georgia municipality contractually indemnify a private party
for any and all loss, damage, and liability arising in connection with a
public works project involving the private party's land?
(2) If not, is there any loss, damage, or liability arising in connection
with a public works project involving a private party's land for which
a Georgia municipality may contractually indemnify the private
party?95
Much to the dismay of CSX, both answers were "no." Implementing
the pertinent Georgia Constitution provision that limited exceptions for
immunity of local government,97 the legislature previously enacted
O.C.G.A. section 36-33-19" and specified that a city cannot waive its
immunity by the purchase of insurance, unless that insurance was to
cover liabilities that could not be successfully asserted because of the
existence of sovereign immunity.99
The indemnification was void
because the contractual provision, purported to allow indemnity to CSX,
was outside of the power of the city to execute as an ultra vires act.' °
The court determined that only the legislature can provide the necessary
authorization to allow the contract of indemnity. 0 '
The second

92. CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 277 Ga. 248, 588 S.E.2d 688 (2003).
93. 277 Ga. 248, 588 S.E.2d 688 (2003).
94. Id. at 248, 588 S.E.2d at 689.

95. Id. at 249, 588 S.E.2d at 689.
96. Id.
97. See GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 9.
98. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1 (2000).
99. CSX Transp., 277 Ga. at 249-50, 588 S.E.2d at 689-90.

100. Id. at 250, 588 S.E.2d at 690.
101. Id.
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question posed by the federal appellate court needed no answer because
the indemnification agreement itself was void.'1 2
IV.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR AGENCY DECISIONS

Evidentiary Standards

Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commissionl" a
illustrated interpretations of both the service of pleadings provisions
under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act ("GAPA")' ° ' and the
evidentiary standards for decisionmaking. 15
The Public Service
Commission ("Commission") fined Douglas Asphalt Company ("Company"), under the Georgia Utility Facility Protection Act, 10 6 for cutting
a cable without having given notice. The Company appealed the fine
levied by the Commission to superior court. The Commission moved to
dismiss because the Company's review petition was only mailed to the
Commission and was not personally served. The superior court rejected
the motion to dismiss, finding that personal service was not required.' °7 The court of appeals agreed, stating that the relevant
provisions of the GAPA only mentioned service, not how service must be
perfected.0 8
Additionally, the Company's prior appeal to the superior court was
premised on the Commission's erroneously imposing a $10,000 fine. The
Company said it had not been digging and was under no duty to provide
advance notification.
However, others' testimony contradicted the
Company's and was sufficient to support the finding by the Commission. 109 Both the superior court and the court of appeals affirmed that
decision."1 0
Gwinnett County v. Lake Lanier Ass'n" was the second and last
case during the survey period in which the review of evidentiary
standards played a significant role." 2 In that case an administrative
law judge was called upon to analyze the county's application for a

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 251, 588 S.E.2d at 690-91.
263 Ga. App. 711, 589 S.E.2d 292 (2003).
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 (2002).
Douglas Asphalt, 263 Ga. App. at 711, 589 S.E.2d at 292.
O.C.G.A. § 25-9-1 (2002).
Douglas Asphalt, 263 Ga. App. at 711, 589 S.E.2d at 293.
Id. at 711-12, 589 S.E.2d at 293-94.
Id. at 712-13, 589 S.E.2d at 294.
Id. at 713, 589 S.E.2d at 294.
265 Ga. App. 214, 593 S.E.2d 678 (2004).
Id. at 218, 593 S.E.2d at 683.
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discharge permit to release treated waste water into Lake Lanier. The
administrative law judge, who initially heard the application, made
extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law in an apparently very
complex case. Upon the granting of the permit to the county, the
association appealed to superior court. The judge reversed certain parts
of the administrative law judge's decision, while affirming others."'
On all of the major points reversed by the trial judge, the court of
appeals reinstated the determinations made by the administrative law
judge, citing mistake, confusion, and use of matters outside the
record." 4 The case will be heard by the Georgia Supreme Court, as
certiorari was granted on April 28, 2004.115 Accordingly, further
analysis of the points raised will be contained in a future article.
B.

Plain Meaning of Statutes

In the first of two cases mentioning the analysis of agency governing
provisions, Tax Commissioner of Fulton County v. Williams. 6 hinged
upon interpretations of the powers of the Fulton County Personnel Board
("Personnel Board")." 7 Williams, fired by the Tax Commissioner,
lodged an appeal with the Personnel Board. When the Personnel Board
reinstated Williams with only a demotion, the Tax Commissioner sought
a writ of mandamus from the Fulton County Superior Court. The
superior court judge affirmed the decision of the Personnel Board, but
the Tax Commissioner was not satisfied and appealed the ruling to the
court of appeals." 8
Candidly, with this degree of tenacity by the Tax Commissioner, the
Author wonders whether Williams would even want to return to that
office. The Tax Commissioner indicated four errors to the court of
appeals." 9 First, the Tax Commissioner argued that there was no
authority for the Personnel Board to change the decision because the
underlying reasons were valid. 12 ° The court determined the argument
was unconvincing because the regulations plainly allowed the Personnel
12 1
Board to institute an action that it deemed to be appropriate.
Second, the decision was attacked because there was no "sufficient

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 214, 593 S.E.2d at 681.
Id.
Hughey v. Gwinnett County, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 348 (Apr. 28, 2004), cert. granted.
267 Ga. App. 139, 598 S.E.2d 862 (2004).
Id. at 139, 598 S.E.2d at 862.
Id., 598 S.E.2d at 863.
Id.
Id. at 140-41, 598 S.E.2d at 863-64.
Id. at 141, 598 S.E.2d at 864 (citing Fulton County Personnel Reg. PR-900-9(2)).
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explanation" given. 122 The court of appeals determined that no such
requirement existed in the applicable regulations.123 Third, the Tax
Commissioner argued that the Personnel Board acted outside of the
applicable regulations. 2 4 In analyzing the personnel regulations and
policies, the court of appeals concluded that the Tax Commissioner
actually terminated Williams under a fairly vague provision encompassing poor performance, and the Personnel Board equated this to a specific
regulation for an offense outlined in the regulations as "Inefficiency and
Incompetence."' 25 Because the most serious penalty for that specific
offense was a demotion, there had been no mistake by the Personnel
Finally, the Tax Commissioner cited as
Board in taking the action.'
error the failure to have evidence in the record on why Williams's
termination had been changed to a demotion.12 The court of appeals
restated the issue as an "any evidence" problem and held that because
entries in the record to such things as computer problems were also
present and could be blamed instead of solely attributing inefficiencies
to Williams, the "any evidence" standard was met. 28
Sometimes the plain meaning of a statute is not so plain. In Hughes
v. Georgia Department of Corrections," plaintiff had been a pharmacist at a Georgia prison. He alleged that his termination was a reprisal
for revealing waste and abuse in the prison pharmacy services. His
resulting complaint, under the Georgia whistle blower statute, 3 0 was
met by a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. The
trial judge interpreted applicable statutes to mean that the termination
of plaintiff could only be set aside, but no monetary damages could be
awarded. In a subsequent motion to dismiss, the Department showed
that what had been plaintiff pharmacist's position, no longer existed.
Based on that fact, the trial court dismissed the case as moot because
setting aside the termination would result in no relief being granted to
plaintiff. Disagreeing with both holdings, plaintiff took his case to the
court of appeals.'

122.
123.
124.
125.
21 and
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 142, 598 S.E.2d at 864.
Id.
Id., 598 S.E.2d at 864-65 (comparing Fulton County Personnel Reg. 1800-2, Art.
1800-2, Art. 10(A)).
Id. at 143, 598 S.E.2d at 865.
Id.
Id.
267 Ga. App. 440, 600 S.E.2d 383 (2004).
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4 (2002).
Hughes, 267 Ga. App. at 440-41, 600 S.E.2d at 384-85.
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Announcing the case as containing first impression rulings under the
whistle blower statute, the court of appeals first examined the ruling
regarding monetary damages. 13 2 The remedy given under the pertinent statute to address reprisals was "a right to have such action set
The court
aside in a proceeding instituted in the superior court."'
determined that the plain meaning of setting an action aside was not
After analyzing dictionary meanings, possible
entirely clear."s
subsidiary effects on the doctrine of sovereign immunity by a completely
disfavored implicit waiver, and the explicit grant of a right to monetary
damages under an analogous employment practices act, the court
concluded a narrow interpretation of "setting aside" was necessary and
did not include a right to seek monetary damages in the action.3
The court of appeals, however, disagreed that the issue regarding
reinstatement was moot. l3 ' Although the actual position that plaintiff
occupied was eliminated, the Department still employed pharmacists at
its facilities, and if the reprisal action was truly to be set aside, it must
mean that plaintiff could be reinstated to a pharmacist position as then
present within the Department's operation.'
C.

Agency Deference

Department of Community Health, Division of Health Planning v.
Gwinnett Hospital System, Inc.'3 8 is perhaps the epitome of an agency
deference case. EHCA, LLC applied to the Division of Health Planning
("Division") for a certificate of need to close Emory Dunwoody Medical
Center and West Paces Medical Center and to relocate the two hospitals
northeast around Duluth, Georgia. Procedurally, the application was
reviewed internally in the Division, where it received an approval.
Numerous opponents, who had intervened, then asked the State Health
Planning Review Board ("Board") to hear an appeal. The appointed
hearing officer conducted extensive hearings and concluded in a lengthy
order that a certificate should be granted. The Board, and thus the
affirmed that ruling, but the opponents appealed to superior
Division,
9
3

court.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 441, 600 S.E.2d at 385.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(e) (2002)).
Id.
Id. at 441-42, 600 S.E.2d at 385-86.
Id. at 443, 600 S.E.2d at 386.
Id. at 444-45, 600 S.E.2d at 387.
262 Ga. App. 879, 586 S.E.2d 762 (2003).
Id. at 879-80, 586 S.E.2d at 764.
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Two opponents, Gwinnett Medical Center and Joan Glancy Memorial
Hospital, filed an appeal in Gwinnett County, and one other opponent,
St. Joseph's Hospital of Atlanta, Inc., filed an appeal in Fulton County.
Both superior courts reversed after determining the primary reasons for
the agency decision were arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by
substantial evidence.'" Following a successful application for discretionary review with the court of appeals, both superior court decisions
were reversed.""
In essence the court of appeals recounted the broad purposes and
duties given to the Department of Community Health ("Department")
and the wide discretion given to both the Department and to the
In a succinct
Division under the certificate of need program.'
account of this delegation, the court stated:
The legislature cedes this authority to the Division because the public
is better served by having experts in the complexities of health care
planning make these decisions. The issues are complicated, and the
applicable laws, rules, regulations, and precedents require much study,
especially
for a decision-maker who is not already familiar with
143
them.

Additionally, deference to the expertise in fulfilling complex roles that
an agency possesses is augmented by deference to the agency's interpretation of its statutory framework and appropriate use of the rules and
regulations that it promulgates.'" In reviewing the factually dependent situations, which the superior courts decided were arbitrary,
capricious, or unsupported by evidence, the court of appeals held that
evidence for each holding and reversed both superior
there was sufficient
145
court judgments.
In Hicks v. Florida State Board of Administration,'" the court of
appeals gave agency deference to interpretations of revenue statutes by
the State Revenue Commissioner. 147 The Florida Board was the
administrator of a pension system designed for Florida state employees
and was created by its state legislature. The Florida Board formed
Buckhead Atlanta Plaza, Inc., a for-profit business corporation, to buy
an Atlanta, Georgia office building. When Buckhead Atlanta Plaza, Inc.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 880, 586 S.E.2d at 764.
Id.
Id. at 880-82, 586 S.E.2d at 764-66.
Id. at 881-82, 586 S.E.2d at 765.
Id. at 882, 586 S.E.2d at 766.
Id. at 884-91, 586 S.E.2d at 766-71.
265 Ga. App. 545, 594 S.E.2d 745 (2004).
Id. at 547-48, 594 S.E.2d at 747.
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recorded the warranty deed on the property, it paid real estate transfer
taxes. Within months the parent board filed a tax protest with the State
Revenue Commissioner, claiming that it was a public authority and
exempt from such taxation under O.C.G.A. section 48-6-2.'" The State
Revenue Commissioner refused the claim, interpreting the relevant
statute as applying only to Georgia public authorities or those of the
United States. The Florida Board appealed to the superior court, which
found the exemption did apply to the Florida Board, and reversed the
ruling of the State Revenue Commissioner. An appeal was taken to the
court of appeals. 49
In presenting his appeal, the State Revenue Commissioner cited the
narrow interpretation of the real estate transfer tax exceptions,
apparently consistent since the original legislative enactment.' 50 After
tracing the legislative history and evaluating legislative interpretations,
the court of appeals decided to defer to the State Revenue Commissioner's consistent interpretation.' 5 ' Various amendments over the
years exemplified why the State Revenue Commissioner's interpretation
was acceptable. 5 ' The most serious obstacle was the recodification of
the Georgia Code, in which punctuation rules changed when commas
and semicolons were used.'53 These changes resulted in the apparent
isolation of the exception for "any public authority" into a separate
phrase not joined by the preceding limiting qualifiers of "the United
States or this state. " "'4 The appellate court, however, cited both the
rules of construction enacted in the Code and prior court cases that held
the recodification was not intended to effect substantive changes.'55
Finally, citing the general interpretive rule that tax exemptions are
construed narrowly, the court reversed the trial court ruling, and the
Florida public authority is now officially a Georgia taxpayer.'5
Another certificate of need case arose during the survey period, this
time in south Georgia. 5 7 In Georgia Department of Community Health
v. Satilla Health Services, Inc.,"' Satilla Health Services, Inc. ("Satil-

148. O.C.G.A. § 48-6-2 (2004).
149. Hicks, 265 Ga. App. at 545-46, 594 S.E.2d at 746-47.
150. Id. at 547, 594 S.E.2d at 747.
151. Id. at 547-50, 594 S.E.2d at 747-49.
152. Id. at 548-50, 594 S.E.2d at 748-49.
153. Id. at 549-50, 594 S.E.2d at 748-49 (citing 1978 Ga. Laws 309 § 2).
154. Id.
155. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 749.
156. Id. at 550-51, 594 S.E.2d at 749-50.
157. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Satilla Health Serv., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 880, 598
S.E.2d 514 (2004).
158. 266 Ga. App. 880, 598 S.E.2d 514 (2004).
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la") applied for a certificate of need so that it could conduct adult openheart surgery services. Two other hospitals opposed the application, and
the Division of Health Planning denied the application. Satilla's appeal
was heard by a hearing officer, who reversed the initial denial. The
hearing officer found that although need requirements were unfulfilled,
a certificate of need should be issued because of a permissible exception
to the need requirements based upon an atypical geographic barrier
exception. The case for a certificate of need was made because of the
large service area, the high rates of cardiovascular disease and death,
and the referral patterns sending patients to Jacksonville, Florida, which
is over seventy-five miles away. 5 9
The Division of Health Planning, through the Department of
Community Health and the two objecting hospitals, appealed to the
The hearing
Health Planning Review Board ("Review Board")."6
officer was reversed, with the following stated conclusion of the Review
Board: "[TIhere was not sufficient credible evidence in the record for the
Hearing Officer to determine that an exception to the need criteria of the
open heart surgery rule was warranted based on the geographic access
problems in the proposed service area." 6 ' Additionally, the review
board determined that the pertinent finding of the hearing officer, which
accessibility barrier, was not
supported the atypical 1geographic
62
supported by the evidence.
Continuing the case in ping-pong like fashion, Satilla then took the
matter to superior court, where the judge reversed on the grounds that
the hearing officer had it right. The Review Board, not the hearing
officer, made decisions that were not based upon the evidence.
Reinstating the decision of the hearing officer, the judge went further
and held the Review Board acted in an arbitrary manner and abused its
discretion."z
The next appeal was by the Department of Community Health and the
The court of appeals granted an application for
two hospitals.'
6 5
The appellate
discretionary appeal and entered one last reversal."
court began by reviewing the applicable procedures set out in O.C.G.A.
section 31-6-44.166 The court stressed that the final decision of the

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
518-19.

Id. at 882-83, 598 S.E.2d at 517.
Id. at 883-84, 598 S.E.2d at 518.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 884, 598 S.E.2d at 518.
Id. at 882-84, 598 S.E.2d at 517-18.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 31-6-44 (2001); Satilla Health, 266 Ga. App. at 884-85, 598 S.E.2d at

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

agency, which was to be afforded deference, was that of the Review
Board, not the initial decision of the hearing officer. 67 The superior
court analyzed the initial decision of the hearing officer and adjudicated
whether the Review Board's subsequent treatment of the initial
determination was correct, not whether the Review Board's decision on
its own could be sustained. 168 The review by the superior court should
have been so limited, and it erred by mistakenly framing its reversal of
the Review Board's decision as correcting the Review Board's failures,
instead of examining it as a permissible decision.' 69 The court of
appeals admitted that the Review Board made its own policy decisions
in determining that the hearing officer should not have applied a
permissible exception to the necessary criteria for the grant of a
certificate of need, but the court still showed deference to the final
decision of that agency instead of the initial decision of the hearing
officer.170
In the last agency deference case, Shrenko v. DeKalb County School
District,'7 ' the court questioned the interpretation given by the State
The DeKalb
Board of Education to O.C.G.A. section 20-2-188.172
County School District ("School District") filed a writ of mandamus
asking the superior court to compel the State Board to change its
manner of state funding for pupil transportation. The cited Code section
provides that state funds will be given for each student living "beyond
one and one-half miles from the school to which they are assigned
.
7The School District urged an interpretation of that phrase to
mean the actual school assignment given to a particular student, not the
school in the attendance zone where the student resided. The superior
court ruled in favor of the School District and awarded a judgment for
past amounts that should have been paid. The court also compelled the
State Board to change its transportation funds calculations to reflect the
school that a student actually attended.7 4 The judgment was appealed to the Georgia Supreme175Court, which reversed the earlier ruling
in favor of the School District.
The supreme court concluded that the questioned statute had been in
place with the same type of reimbursement language since 1965, and the

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

SatillaHealth, 266 Ga. App. at 885, 598 S.E.2d at 519.
Id. at 887, 598 S.E.2d at 520.
Id.
Id. at 887-88, 598 S.E.2d at 520-21.
276 Ga. 786, 582 S.E.2d 109 (2003).
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-188 (2002).
Id. § 20-2-188(d).
Shrenko, 276 Ga. at 786-87, 582 S.E.2d at 111-12.
Id. at 786, 582 S.E.2d at 111.

20041

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

49

State Board used an interpretation of "school to which they are assigned"
since that time to mean the school within the attendance zone of the
This interpretation was capable of being
student's residence. 7
Additionalapplied uniformly and objectively throughout the state.'
ly, although the legislative branch had been aware of majority to
minority school choice programs and the existence of specialized magnet
schools, two different updated school funding laws were enacted during
the forty-year period, and no amendments to the school transportation
funding provisions had ever taken place."7 8 This provided further
reinforcement that the interpretation given by the State Board had been
accepted as correct by the legislature." 9
V.
A-

EFFECT OF AGENCY ACTIONS

CollateralEstoppel from Agency Rulings

During the survey period, Macon Water Authority v. City of Forsyth 80 was the only appellate case decided regarding administrative
The Macon Water
agencies that mentioned collateral estoppel. 8'
Authority ("Authority") entered into a contract with the City of Forsyth
("City") to provide electricity for an expanded water works. Because of
the location of the facility, the parties agreed that in the event of a flood,
contractual obligations would abate until the end of the occurrence. The
contract had an initial five-year term with mandatory arbitration as the
exclusive remedy for a breach. The very next year, the site was flooded
and out of commission for approximately three weeks, causing the
Authority to rethink its commitment. The Authority basically abandoned the power contract without arbitration. The Authority sought a
new arrangement with a different power supplier, and the City tried to
block it by applying for an order from the Public Service Commission.
Subsequently, the City sued for an award in superior court to compel
arbitration. The arbitration award was granted in favor of the City for
appealed only the order of the trial
the contract breaches; the Authority
18 2
court compelling arbitration.
The Authority first argued that the City could not seek to compel
arbitration because it had filed its grievance with the Public Service

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 789-94, 582 S.E.2d at 113-16.
Id. at 793, 582 S.E.2d at 115.
Id.
Id. at 794, 582 S.E.2d at 116.
262 Ga. App. 224, 585 S.E.2d 131 (2003).
Id. at 228, 585 S.E.2d at 135.
Id. at 224-25, 585 S.E.2d at 133.
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Commission. 1" The court was unconvinced because those proceedings
had not involved the Authority, and additionally, the contract between
the parties was not a part of the issues before the Public Service
Second, the Authority cited error because the trial
Commission.'
court did not find the flooding to constitute force majeure.'85 The
appellate court disagreed, determining the trial court acted correctly
because the contract itself provided for the consequences if flooding
occurred.' 8
As its last contention, the Authority argued that the City was subject
to estoppel because the Public Service Commission ruled that the
subsequent contract was not inappropriate. 187 The appellate court
determined there was no merit to the argument, and held the requirements as follows:
Under Georgia law, administrative decisions may have a collateral
estoppel effect in a subsequent judicial proceeding. There are four
requirements for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel: (1)
both proceedings must involve the same parties or their privies; (2)the
issue must have been actually litigated and determined in the first
proceeding; (3) that determination must have been essential to the
judgment in the first proceeding; and (4) the party against whom the
doctrine is asserted must have had a fill opportunity to litigate the
issue in question.'

s

The court determined none of the conditions were satisfied.8 9 From
the record the court also deduced that counsel for the Authority
withdrew the collateral estoppel issue before the superior
explicitly
190
court.

Failureto Follow Agency Rules
The only case during the survey period that illustrates this topic
concerned an employee who allegedly failed to follow the instructions of
his superior and was thus terminated. 9 ' In Jones v. Board of Regents

B.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 225, 585 S.E.2d at 133.
Id. at 225-26, 585 S.E.2d at 133-34.
Id. at 227, 585 S.E.2d at 134.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Swain v. State, 251 Ga. App. 110, 113, 552 S.E.2d 880, 882 (2001)).
Id. at 227, 585 S.E.2d at 134.

190. Id. at 228, 585 S.E.2d at 135.
191. Jones v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 262 Ga. App. 75, 585 S.E.2d

138 (2003).
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of the University System of Georgia,192 Jones was fired as head of
security for Augusta State University ("University"). In an action
brought in superior court, plaintiff alleged that his civil rights had been
violated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,93 that his Georgia constitutional
rights had also been violated, and that he was entitled to remedies
under O.C.G.A. section 45-1-4,194 known as the whistle-blower statute.
He sued the Board of Regents, the president of the University, and his
immediate superior, who was vice-president of the University.195
Plaintiff testified that he had been involved in an investigation of
stealing incidents at the school, and he had suspicions about three of the
security officers working for him. He also learned that marshals from
Richmond County may have received items of stolen property and he
wished to pursue that investigation. According to plaintiff's allegations,
the vice-president of the university instructed him to stop the investigation of Richmond County marshals because of a desire to get along with
other public safety organizations outside the university. Presumably,
because plaintiff continued to pursue the investigation, the vicethe nonrenewal of his
president asked plaintiff either to resign or 1suffer
96
employment contract in about ninety days.
The vice-president of the University had a completely different story.
He testified that plaintiff had been disciplined for incidents of verbal
abuse of employees in the past, and that plaintiff signed a paper at the
time of the prior discipline acknowledging that he would be dismissed if
there was another reported incident of verbal abuse. At approximately
the same time that plaintiff alleged the vice-president ordered him to
stop his investigation, the vice-president testified he received a report
that plaintiff had another incident of verbal abuse of an employee lasting
approximately thirty minutes, and that report occasioned the offer of
resignation or nonrenewal. Defendants moved for summary judgment
before the superior court, which was granted to all defendants on all
three counts, and plaintiff subsequently brought the matter to the court
of appeals.19
Regarding the § 1983 action, the court concluded that the claim of
constitutionally protected speech had been made in the context of
plaintiff's role as an employee, not as a citizen exercising free

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

262 Ga. App. 75, 585 S.E.2d 138 (2003).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4 (2002).
Jones, 262 Ga. App. at 75, 585 S.E.2d at 140.
Id. at 77, 585 S.E.2d at 140.
Id. at 75-77, 585 S.E.2d at 140-41.
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speech. 19 The reports had been made to his superior and were not
made to bring wrongful acts to the attention of the public.' 99 Accordingly, summary judgment had been correctly granted. 200 Plaintiff also
under the Georgia Constitution because they were
waived his arguments 201
not listed in his brief.
The whistle-blower count was another story. The conflicting accounts
of the facts at issue did contain enough circumstantial evidence to show
the possibility that a reprisal had been taken against plaintiff for
bringing the thefts of state property to the attention of his employer. °2
Arguably, that reprisal was a termination of his employment. °3 The
only remedy available was setting aside the retaliatory action, but this
remedy was not one that could be asserted against the president or vicepresident of the university, thus, the whistle-blower count was reversed,
but only against the Board of Regents. 2°
C.

Validity of Rules

Moulder v. Bartow County Board of Education205 resolved the
question of whether a tenured teacher could be subjected to the
termination of an employment contract for events occurring before a
contract renewal was tendered.0 6 Plaintiff was a tenured elementary
school teacher who allegedly "grabbed one of her third grade students by
the shoulders in a harsh manner."0 7 The next week, after warnings
were given to plaintiff by the principal and the human resources
director, the Bartow County Board of Education ("County Board") issued
a new contract to plaintiff for the succeeding school year. During a
hearing held in response to a grievance filed by plaintiff and relating to
the warnings from the principal, the principal informed plaintiff there
would be a recommendation that the new contract be terminated. The
county school superintendent later notified plaintiff that termination
would indeed be sought, and the County Board so ruled. The fact that
plaintiff had not engaged in improper conduct after the date of the
contract tender for renewal was not contested. The County Board,

198.
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200.
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Id. at 78-79, 585 S.E.2d at 142-43.
Id. at 79, 585 S.E.2d at 142.
Id.
Id., 585 S.E.2d at 143.
Id. at 80-81, 585 S.E.2d at 143-44.
Id. at 81, 585 S.E.2d at 144.
Id. at 82, 585 S.E.2d at 144.
267 Ga. App. 339, 599 S.E.2d 495 (2004).
Id. at 339, 599 S.E.2d at 496.
Id. at 341, 599 S.E.2d at 497.
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however, reviewed past instances and found a pattern of conduct that it
used to sustain the termination.2 8
Plaintiff appealed to the State Board of Education ("State Board"),
which reversed the County Board because all of the precipitating events
had occurred before the offering of the new contract. 2 ° The only way
that prior incidents would be relevant would be in combination with an
offense committed during a current contract period to show a pattern of
conduct substantiating reasons for termination.210
The County Board appealed to the Superior Court of Bartow County,
which reversed the decision of the State Board.2 ' Little was added to
the debate by the superior court, except that it relied upon questionable
precedent for the proposition that the County Board should have broad
discretion in school management. The court also analyzed out-of-state
cases because of a paucity of applicable precedent in our state.212
A discretionary appeal was granted by the court of appeals, and it
ended the whole affair by reversing the superior court.213 After
dutifully examining the out-of-state precedent, the court gave significant
weight to the fact that the State Board had previously held, as had outof-state courts, that termination for misconduct prior to the renewal of
the teacher's annual contract was not authorized.214
In Mid-Georgia Environmental Management Group, L.L.L.P v.
Meriwether County,215 the dispute was over the validity of a county
zoning ordinance.2 16 Mid-Georgia proposed a landfill for acreage it
acquired in Meriwether County ("County"). Despite the apparent
prohibition for such use under the county zoning ordinance, Mid-Georgia
sent the County a request for written verification, under O.C.G.A.
section 12-8-24(g),217 asking the County to signify that the landfill
would comply with the ordinance. Their reasoning for the request was
that the zoning ordinance was invalid. Expectedly, the County issued
no such verification, and Mid-Georgia filed for a declaratory judgment
and writ of mandamus in superior court. The trial court ruled against
Mid-Georgia, holding both that the zoning ordinance was valid and did
not provide for the landfill at the specified location, and also that Mid-
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Id. at 341-42, 599 S.E.2d at 498.
Id. at 342-43, 599 S.E:2d at 498.
Id. at 343, 599 S.E.2d at 498.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 339, 599 S.E.2d at 496.
Id. at 343-46, 599 S.E.2d at 500.
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Georgia had made no presentation that the landfill would2 18satisfy the
requirements of the Multi-Jurisdictional Solid Waste Plan.
Mid-Georgia filed an application for appeal to the court of appeals and
a direct appeal to the supreme court.219 Upon the court of appeals
transfer of the application, the supreme court first ruled that the direct
appeal would lie because no decision regarding the actual zoning of the
property was at issue.22 ° The absence of such an administrative ruling
dictated that the direct appeal was the correct appellate route.2 2'
Addressing the merits, the court reviewed the enactment of the
original zoning ordinance and its subsequent amendment and concluded
that the County complied with provisions of the Zoning Procedures
Law. 222 Mid-Georgia presented two additional arguments 223 concerning the validity of the ordinance. First, it claimed that the custodian for
the zoning ordinance, the clerk of the board of county commissioners, did
not keep old copies of sections of the zoning ordinance once amendments
were made.124 The supreme court, however, determined nothing in the
Zoning Procedures Law supported that reasoning for invalidity.225
Mid-Georgia's final argument was tangentially related to the employment of a new zoning commissioner by the County in 1997. That official
apparently did not know whether the maps, which had been incorporated by reference to the zoning ordinance, were correct, and thus, MidGeorgia claimed there was no official zoning map. 2 6 The supreme
court had no problem concluding that this argument could not destroy
the validity of the procedures that had been used to adopt the zoning
ordinance because the enactments stated that the official zoning maps
were incorporated by reference.2 7 Accordingly, the decision of the
superior court was affirmed.2 28
The last case on the validity of rules during the survey period was City
of Macon v. Ailtel Communications, Inc.,229 which was a decision on a

218. Id.; Mid-Georgia,277 Ga. at 671, 594 S.E.2d at 346.
219. Mid-Georgia, 277 Ga. at 671, 594 S.E.2d at 346.
220. Id. at 671-72, 594 S.E.2d at 346-47.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 673, 594 S.E.2d at 347-48 (referencing O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1 to -6 (2000)).
223. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1 to -6 (Supp. 2004); Mid-Georgia, 277 Ga. at 673, 594 S.E.2d
at 347-48.
224. Mid-Georgia, 277 Ga. at 673-74, 594 S.E.2d at 348.
225. Id. at 674, 594 S.E.2d at 348.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 674-75, 594 S.E.2d at 348.
228. Id. at 675, 594 S.E.2d at 349.
229. 277 Ga. 823, 596 S.E.2d 589 (2004).
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certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.y ° The question was transmitted as follows:
Whether Section 18-153 of Article VII of Chapter 18 of the Code of
Ordinances of the City of Macon, Georgia, as amended in July 1999, is
preempted by state law or otherwise invalid so as to preclude the
charge of the subject fees in excess of those provided for under Georgia
Department of Transportation Rules 672-11-.03." '
Alltel hung fiber optic cable on utility poles along the City of Macon's
("City") right-of-way. Pursuant to the cited ordinance, Alltel was
charged two dollars per foot as a permit fee to use the right-of-way,
levied on 25,555 feet of fiber optic cable that had been hung. In 1999
the city amended the ordinance so that the permit fee was raised to four
dollars and fifty cents per foot.2" 2
Alltel filed a complaint in federal court challenging the ordinance as
violating both the Federal Telecommunications Act23 3 and O.C.G.A.
section 32-4-92,2" with its related rules." 5 The cited state provision
allowed a municipality to regulate aspects of usage for wires and poles
along the City's streets but commanded that "such regulations shall not
be more restrictive with respect to utilities affected thereby than are
equivalent regulations promulgated by the department with respect to
utilities on the state highway system under authority of Code Section
32-6-174. "23 6 The department mentioned was the Department of
Transportation ("DOT"), which, pursuant to the cited statute, had
promulgated Rule 672-11-.03 with maximum permit fees for communications cables. 3 7 The federal district court granted summary judgment
to Alltel, ruling that the ordinance was preempted by the state statutes
and regulations and also entered a declaratory judgment to that
effect.23 8 The City appealed, resulting in the certified question set out
above.23 9
The City presented an argument that the DOT did not intend to place
limitations on the powers of a city to set fees.2'
The court rejected

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 823, 596 S.E.2d at 589.
Id. at 824, 596 S.E.2d at 591.
Id. at 825, 596 S.E.2d at 591-92.
47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000).
O.C.G.A. § 32-4-92 (2001).
Alltel Communications, 277 Ga. at 826, 596 S.E.2d at 592.
O.C.G.A. § 32-4-92(a)(10) (Supp. 2004).
AlItel Communications, 277 Ga. at 826, 596 S.E.2d at 592.
Id. at 826-27, 596 S.E.2d at 592-93.
Id. at 827, 596 S.E.2d at 593.
Id. at 828, 596 S.E.2d at 593.
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this argument because it determined that intent was an irrelevant issue,
and the subject transportation statute was plain on its face."4 The
court noted the existence of a similar statute for counties, listed in
O.C.G.A. section 32-4-42(6),242 which the court ruled also contained the

limitation feature on fees.2 ' The City additionally presented arguments that the fee could be substantiated as a franchise fee, a revenueproducing tax, or some other type of municipal tax.2 " Noting that the
ordinance was labeled as a permit fee and that the City used that term
repeatedly, the court rejected the new labels. 2" Accordingly, the
supreme court answered the question by ruling the ordinance was
preempted."4
VI.

DIRECT APPEAL OR APPLICATION TO APPEAL

This segment of the Article continues to be a necessary division
because of the confusion of practitioners and, to some extent, the
confusion in appellate court cases regarding O.C.G.A. section 5-6-35.247
In addition to Mid-GeorgiaEnvironmentalManagement Group, L.L.L.P
v. Meriwether County,24 discussed above, four other cases discussing
the issue were decided during the survey period. There seems to be a
good argument for practitioners to file both a notice of appeal and an
application for appeal if there is any doubt whatsoever about which
procedure is correct. The assurance of preserving the right to present
a case at the appellate level seems worth the duplication until further
legislation or cases provide clarity.
Nelson v. Fulton County249 showed exactly how a practitioner can get
into trouble. Plaintiff suffered the denial of a rezoning application and
then filed a complaint against both Fulton County and the Fulton
County Board of Commissioners for declaratory and injunctive relief.
Unfortunately, the superior court dismissed the action, and plaintiff filed
a direct appeal.25 ° In a few short paragraphs, the court of appeals
dismissed the action and stated what it called a "bright-line rule that all

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 828-29, 596 S.E.2d at 594.
O.C.G.A. § 32-4-42(6) (2001).
Alltel Communications, 277 Ga. at 829, 596 S.E.2d at 594.
Id. at 830, 596 S.E.2d at 595.
Id.
Id. at 830-31, 596 S.E.2d at 595.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (Supp. 2004).
277 Ga. 670, 594 S.E.2d 344 (2004).
262 Ga. App. 382, 585 S.E.2d 710 (2003).
Id. at 382, 585 S.E.2d at 710.
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appeals1 to either appellate court in zoning cases must come by applica25
tion."
Sometimes even agencies forget the rules. In Coweta County v.
Jackson,252 the County sought to have its tax digest approved, and the
State Revenue Commissioner gave only a conditional approval, requiring
a bond for the differences in assessment amounts. The County lodged
an administrative appeal before a hearing officer on behalf of the
Department of Revenue, who upheld the prior order. On a subsequent
again, so the County filed
appeal to superior court, the order was upheld
2
a direct appeal to the court of appeals. 1
Predictably, the State Revenue Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss
because of the discretionary appeal statute.254 The court agreed,
stating that regardless of the points of differentiation insisted upon by
the County, it "is clearly appealing255from a superior court's review of an
administrative agency's decision."
Practitioners should note that a mandamus action simply will not
assure the availability of a direct appeal. In Northwest Social & Civic
256
the mayor of Atlanta denied a liquor license
Club, Inc. v. Franklin,
renewal, and the club subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus
and certiorari in the superior court. The matter was resolved against
the club on motion for summary judgment.2 57
Displaying a degree of caution, the club filed both an application for
discretionary appeal and a direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme
Court.258 The court denied the discretionary appeal on the merits.259
Likewise, the court dismissed the direct appeal. 2" The supreme court
labeled the case as the review of an administrative decision. 26' The
court determined that the route for an appeal must be by application,
of that application is itself an appellate decision with res
and the denial 262
judicata effect.

251.
(1989)).
252.
253.
254.
255.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. (citing Trend Dev. Corp. v. Douglas County, 259 Ga. 425, 426, 383 S.E.2d 123
264 Ga. App. 17, 589 S.E.2d 839 (2003).
Id. at 17-18, 589 S.E.2d at 839-40.
Id. at 18, 589 S.E.2d at 840.
Id.

276 Ga. 859, 583 S.E.2d 858 (2003).
Id. at 860, 583 S.E.2d at 859.
Id. at 859-60, 583 S.E.2d at 859.
Id. at 860, 583 S.E.2d at 859.
Id. at 861, 583 S.E.2d at 859.
Id. at 860, 583 S.E.2d at 859.
Id.
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Last on the list for this section is a case that provides an acknowledged aberration from the rest. In Augusta-Richmond County v.
Lee, 2 plaintiff applied for an alcoholic beverage license, which the
county commission refused. Plaintiff filed for a writ of mandamus in
superior court to compel the issuance of the license, and the court
granted plaintiff's petition. 2 ' The county commission then brought a
direct appeal, which the supreme court dismissed; however, upon motion
According to the
for reconsideration, the appeal was accepted. 2"
supreme court, there were three prior cases from the county just like
this one that the court accepted and did not dismiss for failure to apply
for a discretionary appeal. 2 ' By a direct pronouncement, the court
said it would not be so forgiving in the future and would adhere to the
application requirement. 2" Turning to the actual case, the supreme
court had little problem reversing the superior court's issuance of the
The court disagreed that the decision was
writ of mandamus. 2"
arbitrary and capricious and concluded that the county commission
followed the pertinent provisions for decisionmaking to the letter.269
VII.

RECENT LEGISLATION

Agency creation, abolition, and changes proved numerous at the 2004
regular session of the Georgia General Assembly. One enactment from
the 2004 special session is also included. Alterations to the general law,
as opposed to local enactments, included the following:
of Agriculture now has separate administrative
1. The Commissioner
20
procedures;
2. There is a brand new Agricultural Commodities Commission for
Beef71 and a White Shrimp Aquaculture Development Advisory Coun2
cil;
3. The Shore Protection Committee and the Coastal Marshlands
Protection272Committee now have different membership and numbers for
quorums;

263. 277 Ga. 483, 592 S.E.2d 71 (2004).
264. Id. at 483, 592 S.E.2d at 71.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 483-84, 592 S.E.2d at 71-72.
268. Id. at 484, 592 S.E.2d at 72.
269. Id.
270. 2004 Ga. Laws 598, §§ 1-3 (enacting O.C.G.A. § 2-2-9.1 and amending O.C.G.A.
§§ 50-13-19, -42 (2002)).
271. Id. at 948-71, Part I, § 1-1, and Part II, § 2-1 (enacting O.C.G.A. §§ 2-8-90 to -114
and 2-15-1 to -14).
272. Id. at 400-01, §§ 1-2 (amending O.C.G.A. § 12-5-235, 283 (2001)).
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4. The Department of Natural Resources must publish statements
regarding why they wish273 to promulgate or amend regulations on
environmental protection;
5. There274is now, in each judicial circuit, a sexual assault protocol
committee;
6. A new General Oversight Committee for the Georgia Public
Defender Standards Council has been created, along with a State Victim
as a part of the statewide public defender
Services Commission
275
programs;
of the State Commission on Family Violence has been
7. The existence
276
prolonged;
8. There is a new Department of Early Care and Learning and a
Board of Early Care and Learning replacing the Office of School
Readiness7 and portions of the duties of the Georgia Child Care
Council;

27

Oversight Committee is
9. A HOPE Scholarship/Pre-K Legislative
278
now a part of the general assembly;
10. The Georgia Medical Center Authority has been assigned279for
administrative purposes to the Department of Community Affairs;
Office of Vital Records within the
11. There is now officially a State
20
Department of Human Resources;
12. The Subsequent Injury Trust Fund is gone;28'
13. The Organized Crime Prevention Council is also gone. The
membership slot on the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, formerly
of the abolished council, goes to the director of
held by the chairman
28 2
homeland security;
of the Harold J. Holtz Municipal Training Institute is
14. The2 board
3
abolished; 1

273. Id. at 329-31, §§ 1-3 (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 12-16-1, -3, -6, -7, and -8 (2001), and
enacting new O.C.G.A. §§ 12-16-20 to -23 (Supp. 2004)).
274. Id. at 466-68, § 3 (enacting new O.C.G.A. §§ 15-24-1, -2 (Supp. 2004)).
275. 2005 Ga. Laws ES3, § 13 (enacting new O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10.1 (Supp. 2004)); Id.
§ 25 (enacting new O.C.G.A. ch. 35-6 (Supp. 2004)).
276. 2004 Ga. Laws 491-92, § 1 (amending O.C.G.A. § 19-13-35 (2004)).
277. Id. at 645,647-75, §§ 1-3 (amending O.C.G.A. ch. 20-IA (1996) and §§ 49-5-240 to 244 (2002)).
278. Id. at 922, 934-35, § 8 (enacting new O.C.G.A. § 20-3-519.13 (Supp. 2004)).
279. Id. at 486-87, § 1 (amending O.C.G.A. § 20-15-3 (Supp. 2004)).
280. Id. at 477-84, §§ 1-11 (amending various provisions of O.C.G.A. ch. 31-10 (2001 &
Supp. 2003)).
281. Id. at 152-53, § 1 (enacting new O.C.G.A. § 34-9-368 (Supp. 2004)).
282. Id. at 988-89, §§ 1-2 (amending O.C.G.A. § 35-6A-3 (Supp. 2000 & 2003) and
repealing O.C.G.A. ch. 85-7 (2000)).
283. Id. at 983-85, § 1 (amending O.C.G.A. ch. 36-45 (2000)).
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15. There is now a State Licensing Board for Residential and General
Contractors; 284 and
16. The Department of Industry, Trade, and Tourism has become the
Its governing board and
Department of Economic Development.
commissioner get a similar name change.8 5

284. Id. at 786-813, § 1 (enacting new O.C.G.A. ch. 43-41 (Supp. 2004)).
285. Id. at 690-709, §§ 1-43 (amending various titles of the O.C.G.A.).

